Worried U S on Indian Nuke strength and killing of Shastri

August 30, 2009 0 By narayan28

 

Is this first time for U S to worry on India’s Nuke strength? US much worried even during 1965 war after receiving from CIA the report related to India’s Nuke strength. Who gave killing contract (supari) to the killer of Lal Bahadur Shastri?

1. TOI reported on Aug 28, 2009: US nuclear pundits feel the Indian establishment — political, scientific, or both in concerts – may be lining up to conduct more nuclear tests to validate and improve the country’s arsenal before the Obama administration shuts the door on nuclear explosions.

2. Is this first time for U S to worry on India’s Nuke strength? Documents related to CIA disclosed the ghost of India’s nuclear strength always remained in the White House as ghost of Lincoln still remains in the White House. 

3.’Soviet spy in Delhi was CIA mole’, what does it mean?

There were moles in PMO of mostly PMs including Indira, Rajiv & Narsimha Rao.

 

Had these reports give any clue on the killing of Lal bahadur Shastri?

Did CIA-ISI nexus execute killing contract (gave supari) to the Kremlin cook Ahmed Sattarov or else at Tashkent? Was lal Bahadur Shastri’s mysterious death due to heart attack by poison?

 

Spying on the Bomb

There is a book written by Jeffrey T Richelson under title “Spying on the bomb”. I remind the A.G. NOORANI’s review on this book on the context of the news of Aug 28, 2009 as mentioned above.     

 

The book is a comprehensive survey of U.S. intelligence on the bomb in countries including India, Pakistan, the USSR and Israel.

Another book of Thomas Powers, on the then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director is also excellent. CIA had “an agent” in the Indian Cabinet. Anderson called him “a source close to Mrs. Gandhi”.

Detailed reports of the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov’s talks with “Indian officials” in New Delhi, on December 12, 1971, while the war was on, reached the CIA. How?

Anderson’s disclosures were lapped up. His conclusions did not cause a ripple: “The fact was that the CIA had penetrated the Indian government at every level and these `independent sources’ sent a steady stream of reports back to Washington on troop movements, logistics, strategy and even some of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s secret conversations” (emphasis added throughout).

The CIA reported from India as early as on October 22, 1964: “The Government of India (GOI) has all of the elements necessary to produce a nuclear weapon and it has the capability to assemble a bomb quickly. India does not plan to commence work on the bomb as yet because the GOI is convinced the CHICOMS [Chinese Communists] will not have an offensive nuclear capability for at least five years. In the meantime, should the situation change, India is relying on President Johnson’s assurances to come to the aid of any nation menaced by China.

Another cable reporting “Indian military views” in December 1964 is heavily censored. It remarked: “One consequence of an Indian program is that one more national state, India, could someday be able to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. In time, the Indians will gain access to rocket technology (perhaps through an earth satellite program) that would give them some delivery capability against us. Secondly, one more national state would have the capacity for starting nuclear actions with a fair chance of spreading and involving the United States.” The deletions are in the original. Evidently, some army brass talked freely to American diplomats or CIA agents. “..

The CIA reported on October 18, 1965 that it would take India a year “to develop nuclear weapons” after a decision to do so. “They could probably produce a weapon deliverable by the Canberra light bomber about two years after a first test.” India could produce “about a dozen weapons in the 20 KT range by 1970”.

A Special National Intelligence Estimate was produced three days later on “India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy”. Its opening page read thus: “The Problem: To estimate India’s nuclear weapons policy over the next few years. Conclusions: A. India has the capability to develop nuclear weapons. It probably already has sufficient plutonium for a first device, and could explode it about a year after a decision to develop one. [Paras 1-3]. B. The proponents of a nuclear weapons program have been strengthened by the Indo-Pakistani war, but the main political result has been a strengthening of Prime Minister Shastri’s position. We believe that he does not now wish to start a program and that he is capable of making this decision stick for the time being. [Paras 4-14]. C. However, we do not believe that India will hold to this policy indefinitely. All things considered, we believe that within the next few years India probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear weapons [Paras 15-20].” In 1974 the prediction came true.

In 1966, the U.S. Embassy was directed to keep a close watch on nuclear-related activities. Pokhran I in 1974 came as a humiliating shock to the CIA. Its Director asked “the Intelligence-Community Staff to assess” its own performance. How far was Pokhran I anticipated “both in a technical and political sense”. The Report, produced in July 1974, is drastically cut. As ISI came as a humiliating shock

In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson directed an all-out effort to get intelligence on India’s nuclear programme. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi was very active in reporting the developments. It was the same story in Islamabad. “It did not take such secret intelligence to keep the Indian nuclear weapons problem in front of key decision-makers such as President Richard Nixon, or his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger had been cautioning Indira Gandhi against a test since 1970, when press reports suggested, prematurely, that India was considering conducting a nuclear test. The State Department, then under the command of William Rogers, informed India that employment of the plutonium from the CIRUS reactor for a test would be considered a violation of India’s pledge of peaceful uses of the heavy water that had been provided by the United States.

CIA failed to predict Pokhran I and Pokhran II. Like this ISI also failed to locate the movement of Indian forces at the time or 1956 war.

Success and unsuccessful of CIA on the follow-up of India’s Nuke strength is always worried to the United States. Ghost of India’s Nuke strength always oppressed to the America as Lincoln’s ghost in the Whitehouse.

 

Analysis by Premendra Agrawal

 

Book on mysterious death of Lal Bahadur Shastri written by Premendra, is coming soon………..

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