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Pakistan's Balancing Act Tested After Munir's Iran Trip

By News Analysis India · · 4 min read

Pakistan's bid to present itself as a credible intermediary in the Middle East is running into serious obstacles, a new report has argued. Escalating friction with Iran, a strengthening defence partnership with Saudi Arabia and the practical need to keep working ties with Washington have combined to make Islamabad's diplomatic juggling act increasingly difficult.

The report examines the gap between Pakistan's diplomatic ambitions and the choices it is making on security and the economy. Its central argument is that these choices are beginning to pull in different directions.

Field Marshal Asim Munir arrived in Tehran on October 20, according to the report. His visit was intended to bolster Pakistan's mediating role at a time of growing instability across the region. Yet the trip came amid a disruption to traffic through major border crossings, which was already hurting trade between the neighbours.

The suspension of operations at the Taftan and Gabd-Rimdan crossings left roughly 2,000 trucks stuck, the report says. The stoppage affected cross-border commerce and deepened uncertainty among traders in both countries. Islamabad pointed to border security concerns, smuggling and the need for better border management as the reasons behind the restrictions. Iranian authorities, for their part, characterised the disruption as a temporary technical or precautionary step.

Iranian accounts of Munir's meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian indicate that the Pakistani army chief spoke about resolving border-related problems and restoring normal commercial traffic.

Land trade routes between Pakistan and Iran, the report stresses, carry considerable economic weight. With Iran's maritime trade under growing pressure from sanctions, alternative corridors for essential goods have gained importance. Overland routes cannot replace large seaports, but they offer a useful supplementary channel and sustain local businesses.

Pakistan had previously permitted goods bound for Iran from third countries to move through designated crossings. The later curbs on movement, however, showed how quickly security and political decisions can unsettle such trade arrangements.

Pakistan's approach to sanctions has also drawn scrutiny. The foreign ministry was reported to have said that Islamabad would comply with the sanctions in force, without specifying which measures it had in mind. According to the report, this lack of clarity could expose traders and transport operators to greater financial risk.

The report identifies deepening defence links with Saudi Arabia as a significant factor complicating Pakistan's diplomacy. As Houthi attacks in Yemen intensified, a defence pact between the two countries was activated on October 5, giving Pakistan a more defined role in Riyadh's security architecture.

One day before Munir's Tehran trip, the Pakistani army made public a discussion with the Saudi ambassador on enhancing defence cooperation and strategic alignment. Islamabad maintains that Pakistani personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia are carrying out defensive responsibilities and will not participate in military operations in Yemen. Still, the report suggests that the growing military relationship could heighten Iranian concerns.

The report makes clear that it would be unwarranted to infer from these events that the United States directed Pakistan to shut the border crossings. The available developments do not substantiate any such connection.

Iran, meanwhile, has kept a hard line on negotiations with the United States even as Munir pursues his initiative. Tehran has said talks with Washington will not restart unless there is progress on its demands, which include ending the blockade, easing oil export sanctions and stopping regional hostilities. Security official Mohsen Rezaei was also reported to have stated that the country's enriched nuclear material would stay within Iran.

Balochistan's security environment forms another important layer of the Pakistan-Iran relationship, the report observes. Nationalist insurgency has long simmered in the province, and Iranian security forces have faced armed groups active near the frontier. The report recalls the reciprocal strikes exchanged by Pakistan and Iran in January 2024 as an example of how border tensions can quickly turn into military clashes.

Interruptions to cross-border trade fall heavily on ordinary citizens and businesspeople. Truck drivers and merchants who rely on the movement of goods between the two countries are among the worst affected. Vehicles stuck at the border, perishable goods lost to delay, rising transport costs and missed commercial opportunities are the immediate fallout.

In the report's assessment, Pakistan must manage several priorities simultaneously. It needs to preserve Iran's confidence, expand security cooperation with Saudi Arabia, maintain functional relations with the United States and keep regional trade flowing reliably. The goals are not mutually exclusive, the report concludes, but reaching them will demand consistent and transparent policymaking.

Reopening the Taftan and Gabd-Rimdan crossings is presented as a necessary first step. The report warns, however, that restoring trust between Pakistan and Iran will be a considerably harder task. Pakistan's standing as a diplomatic mediator, it concludes, will depend not just on bringing rivals together but on whether its trade, border and defence decisions match its diplomatic commitments.