Congressional team pushes for stricter export controls on AI tech to hostile nations
Washington, August 26 – A mixed group of legislators from both parties has urged the U.S. administration to tighten export‑control measures preventing American entities from supplying advanced surveillance, cyber and artificial‑intelligence technologies to civilian intelligence services in China and Russia.
The coalition, which includes Senators Ron Wyden (D), Peter Welch (D), John Cornyn (R), and Representatives Pat Harrigan (R), Michael McCall (R) and Sara Jacobs (D), has written to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick requesting the full implementation of the 2022 export‑control provisions approved by Congress. Those provisions were intended to close loopholes that allow foreign intelligence agencies to obtain U.S. expertise.
Current U.S. rules prohibit assistance to military intelligence organizations of adversary states but leave civilian intelligence and security agencies largely unregulated. The lawmakers warn that this gap enables foreign agencies to legally hire U.S. consultants, purchase sophisticated monitoring tools, and exploit AI‑driven cyber capabilities, potentially targeting American citizens and compromising national security.
While the Trump administration in 2021 introduced controls targeting firms dealing with military intelligence in China, Russia and other concern countries, the 2022 legislation broadened the scope to include civilian intelligence and security entities. The Biden administration attempted to draft implementing regulations in 2024, but the draft never progressed to final rulemaking.
To seal the legal weakness, the legislators recommend the Commerce Department develop a "trusted‑countries" list based on human‑rights records and the absence of hostile surveillance activities. Companies would need a licence to provide services to any intelligence or security agency outside that list.
The proposal also aims to tighten regulations around private surveillance contractors that often hide client identities to avoid oversight. The team suggests mandatory sworn statements from foreign surveillance firms confirming that none of their clients belong to disallowed intelligence agencies. Moreover, they call for expanded controls over biometric and classification technologies beyond facial‑recognition systems, noting the risk of misuse for mass monitoring.
The bipartisan push reflects mounting worries in Washington about the potential for U.S. technology to be repurposed by adversaries, undermining American security and diplomatic objectives.