Afghan‑Islamic State Proxy Gains Ground in Khyber and Balochistan
Washington, Aug 29 – A new intelligence brief indicates that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is still active in Pakistan’s north‑west Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and south‑west Balochistan provinces. The group’s survival, it says, is largely due to tacit toleration by certain actors inside Pakistan’s security services.
Taliban spokespeople allege that Islamabad is turning a blind eye to ISKP’s operations, even permitting the movement of the group’s commander Sunallah Gafari through alleged camps inside Pakistan. According to the same source, the Taliban publicly claimed in June that they struck ISKP‑linked targets in both provinces.
The document critiques Pakistan’s decades‑long “strategic depth” policy, which treated Afghanistan as a rear‑area buffer against India and Western pressure. The strategy assumed that a friendly Afghan government would give Islamabad strategic breathing space. The analysis argues that this assumption has collapsed.
After the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, Pakistani officials expected the group to accept a fixed border, suppress the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan, and rely on Pakistani trade routes. Instead, the Taliban insisted on independence, leading to deteriorating Islamabad‑Kabul ties, border clashes, aerial attacks, economic coercion, and mutual blame for supporting terror networks.
In February 2026, Defence Minister Khwaja Muhammad Asif warned that Pakistan’s patience had run out and that an open confrontation was unfolding.
ISKP is portrayed as the Taliban’s chief jihadi adversary, adopting the global Islamic State brand and branding the Taliban as illegitimate. Since 2021, the Taliban have pursued an aggressive counter‑ISKP campaign. Any Pakistani leniency could weaken those efforts and allow a broader regional terrorist infrastructure to grow.
The report also points to the Wakhan Corridor – a thin strip that connects Afghanistan directly to China’s Xinjiang region – as a future strategic conduit. By May 2026, around 70% of the corridor’s construction was reported complete. Once opened, Afghanistan could trade with China without traversing Pakistani land, potentially curbing Pakistan’s historic influence over Afghan logistics and diminishing the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor’s importance for Afghan trade.