India, since its 1998 Pokhran-II tests, has maintained a policy of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ with a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine. However, the shifting international landscape is causing strategic thinkers to re-evaluate India’s long-term security interests. Some experts, like Professor Happymon Jacob, believe that if the US resumes testing, India should seize the opportunity to conduct its own thermonuclear tests, thereby validating its capabilities and addressing any doubts about its 1998 hydrogen bomb test.

With an estimated 180 warheads in 2025, India’s arsenal is substantial, though smaller than China’s projected 1,000 warheads by 2030. Pakistan’s growing arsenal, potentially reaching 200 warheads by 2028, adds to the regional complexity. China’s advanced DF-41 ICBM, with MIRV capabilities, further complicates India’s deterrence strategy.

Facing dual deterrence challenges from Pakistan and China, any decision by India to resume testing carries significant diplomatic implications. While its voluntary moratorium has bolstered its international image and facilitated key agreements, breaking it could invite criticism. Proponents argue, however, that in an era of intensifying great power competition, India cannot afford to fall behind technologically and must validate its thermonuclear designs and enhance its deterrence credibility.

India has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since the 1998 Pokhran-II tests. This commitment to ‘credible minimum deterrence’ underpins its no-first-use nuclear policy. However, the evolving international security landscape is leading experts to question if continued restraint serves India’s long-term interests. Some strategists propose that if other major powers resume testing, India should seize the moment to conduct its own thermonuclear tests. This, they argue, would validate its advanced nuclear capabilities and dispel any lingering doubts about the effectiveness of its 1998 hydrogen bomb test.

India currently possesses an estimated 180 warheads, with neighbors Pakistan and China holding significant arsenals of approximately 170 and 600 warheads, respectively. China’s growing arsenal and its deployment of advanced ICBMs with MIRV capabilities present a complex deterrence challenge for India. While any new Indian test would carry diplomatic risks, including potential international criticism, proponents argue that technological parity and credibility in a competitive environment necessitate such a move. The decision hinges on balancing national security imperatives with international commitments.