Two weeks after the communal violence between two major ethnic groups in Manipur—the Kukis and the Meiteis—the state, though calmer, remains tense, with as many as 45,000 displaced people still staying at shelters in different places in the state and outside, and the last rites of 73 bodies in various mortuaries yet to be completed.
Not all displaced people are direct victims of the riots, but villagers on both sides have fled to where they believe is safer. While the Kukis fear raids by organised mobs from the larger Meitei community, Meitei farming villages at the base of the hills remain apprehensive of attacks by Kuki militants, who are in a Suspension of Operation (SoO) truce with the government.
Under the SoO agreement, there are 25 Kuki militant organisations in two groupings—KNO and UPF. Cadres are allowed to keep their weapons, but only within the confines of designated camps supervised by the Assam Rifles. Each member gets a monthly stipend of Rs 5,000.
The SoO understanding between Indian security forces and Kuki militants was informally reached in the 1990s, not long after another bout of bloody ethnic clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis—in which the Kukis suffered casualties disproportionately. The state government then was not made party to this, causing some hiccups in the larger counter-insurgency strategy. In 2008, this was solved, with SoO becoming an official tripartite agreement between the Kuki militants, the Centre and the state government. Some had speculated that this was also a counterweight to the influence of Naga and Meitei insurgents.
Thankfully, Meitei insurgents have stayed away from the present bloodletting. CorCom, a coordination committee they formed, instead came out with a statement which appealed for a return to normalcy, alleging that a gameplan of the Indian government to fragment Manipur’s society is the hidden cause for the present crisis.
On the other hand, 10 Kuki MLAs, currently outside the state, are demanding a separate administration for the Kukis on the basis that the Kukis cannot live together with the Meiteis again. They have also charged that Manipur Chief Minister N Biren Singh and Rajya Sabha MP Leishemba Sanajaoba (both from the Meitei community) masterminded the recent carnage by sponsoring two little-known Meitei organisations—Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun.
The spark for the May 3 riots came from Churachandpur district, dominated by the Kukis and aligned tribes, when a solidarity rally of Nagas and Kukis to protest a proposal for inclusion of Meiteis in the Scheduled Tribes list turned violent. As the rally was concluding, a rumour that a Kuki war memorial site on the outskirts of Churachandpur township had been burned down by Meiteis—led to a mob rampage. Meitei settlements in and around Torbung, a village in the border area between Churachandpur and Bishnupur, were razed.
The memorial site is intact but pictures and videos of a tyre found burning near the gate is now available. Only an inquiry can determine if the incineration of the tyre matches the time that it is said to have begun burning.
When images of the arson attacks started spreading, and there also seemed no sign that the government was making any effort to take control, the violence spread. In Imphal, everything was normal until about 7 pm, before an arson case in the New Lambulane locality was reported. By the next day, the violence spread to several Kuki- and Meitei-dominated districts.
Why have only the Kukis responded so aggressively and not the Nagas? In the past, there have also been extreme tensions between the Nagas and the Meiteis, like when Thuingaleng Muivah, leader of the powerful Naga insurgent group NSCN(IM), was denied entry into Manipur by the state government—but such incidents did not result in communal riots.
The answer may lie in certain developments in recent times. One is the revival of an old narrative that the Kukis are nomadic and not indigenous to Manipur. Muivah has said this in several recent public statements as well. Other rivals also added to this, insulting the Kukis indiscriminately with adjectives like “refugees”, “foreigners”, etc., making this an open sore for the latter.
Kuki villages also have a tendency to proliferate because of a peculiar landholding tradition where village chiefs are sole owners of their villages, inducing capable villagers to leave and set up their own villages. This being so, even government initiatives such as the eviction of encroachers from reserved forests, the fight against Manipur’s new scourge of poppy plantations, or the push for citizenship registration, etc., came to be seen as targeting the Kukis.
On the other hand, the stated reason for the Meitei demand for ST status is so they are not alienated from their land. They also see injustice in the fact there is no creamy layer clause in the ST reservation system, thereby giving ST colleagues in similar or even higher income brackets a head start in matters of job pursuits and tax savings.
A skewed land revenue administration system inherited from colonial times—separating revenue flatlands from non-revenue hills—has also pushed the Meiteis against the wall. While everybody can settle in the Imphal Valley, traditionally the Meiteis’ home and which forms 10% of the state’s area, the Meiteis are prohibited from settling in the hills which constitute 90% of the area. As land scarcity is confronted by a burgeoning population, there is an increasing sense of siege amongst these communities. Though it is unlikely they would be eager to settle in the hills even if they were free to do so, the very knowledge that they are prohibited to do so has heightened their claustrophobia.
Three decades ago, of the 20 hill constituencies in Manipur’s 60-member Assembly, Nagas generally won 12 and Kukis 8. Today it is 10 each. Even a little influx of voters from outside can alter the balance further in these small constituencies. The examples of Kangpokpi, Chandel and Tengnoupal constituencies illustrate the potential for such a future conflict: Kangpokpi, once capable of having Naga, Kuki or even Nepali representatives, has today become a Kuki stronghold. Tengnoupal was once a Naga bastion, but today it has a Kuki representative. Chandel, once under a Naga grip, is now finely balanced between the Nagas and the Kukis.
Collective insecurities combined to make just the right mix for the storm on May 3. The question remains: what next? If the underlying causes of these troubles remain, there is no guarantee that more explosions like these will not happen in the future.
Pradip Phanjoubam
Editor of Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
Two weeks after the communal violence between two major ethnic groups in Manipur—the Kukis and the Meiteis—the state, though calmer, remains tense, with as many as 45,000 displaced people still staying at shelters in different places in the state and outside, and the last rites of 73 bodies in various mortuaries yet to be completed.
Not all displaced people are direct victims of the riots, but villagers on both sides have fled to where they believe is safer. While the Kukis fear raids by organised mobs from the larger Meitei community, Meitei farming villages at the base of the hills remain apprehensive of attacks by Kuki militants, who are in a Suspension of Operation (SoO) truce with the government.
Under the SoO agreement, there are 25 Kuki militant organisations in two groupings—KNO and UPF. Cadres are allowed to keep their weapons, but only within the confines of designated camps supervised by the Assam Rifles. Each member gets a monthly stipend of Rs 5,000.googletag.cmd.push(function() {googletag.display(‘div-gpt-ad-8052921-2’); });
The SoO understanding between Indian security forces and Kuki militants was informally reached in the 1990s, not long after another bout of bloody ethnic clashes between the Nagas and the Kukis—in which the Kukis suffered casualties disproportionately. The state government then was not made party to this, causing some hiccups in the larger counter-insurgency strategy. In 2008, this was solved, with SoO becoming an official tripartite agreement between the Kuki militants, the Centre and the state government. Some had speculated that this was also a counterweight to the influence of Naga and Meitei insurgents.
Thankfully, Meitei insurgents have stayed away from the present bloodletting. CorCom, a coordination committee they formed, instead came out with a statement which appealed for a return to normalcy, alleging that a gameplan of the Indian government to fragment Manipur’s society is the hidden cause for the present crisis.
On the other hand, 10 Kuki MLAs, currently outside the state, are demanding a separate administration for the Kukis on the basis that the Kukis cannot live together with the Meiteis again. They have also charged that Manipur Chief Minister N Biren Singh and Rajya Sabha MP Leishemba Sanajaoba (both from the Meitei community) masterminded the recent carnage by sponsoring two little-known Meitei organisations—Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun.
The spark for the May 3 riots came from Churachandpur district, dominated by the Kukis and aligned tribes, when a solidarity rally of Nagas and Kukis to protest a proposal for inclusion of Meiteis in the Scheduled Tribes list turned violent. As the rally was concluding, a rumour that a Kuki war memorial site on the outskirts of Churachandpur township had been burned down by Meiteis—led to a mob rampage. Meitei settlements in and around Torbung, a village in the border area between Churachandpur and Bishnupur, were razed.
The memorial site is intact but pictures and videos of a tyre found burning near the gate is now available. Only an inquiry can determine if the incineration of the tyre matches the time that it is said to have begun burning.
When images of the arson attacks started spreading, and there also seemed no sign that the government was making any effort to take control, the violence spread. In Imphal, everything was normal until about 7 pm, before an arson case in the New Lambulane locality was reported. By the next day, the violence spread to several Kuki- and Meitei-dominated districts.
Why have only the Kukis responded so aggressively and not the Nagas? In the past, there have also been extreme tensions between the Nagas and the Meiteis, like when Thuingaleng Muivah, leader of the powerful Naga insurgent group NSCN(IM), was denied entry into Manipur by the state government—but such incidents did not result in communal riots.
The answer may lie in certain developments in recent times. One is the revival of an old narrative that the Kukis are nomadic and not indigenous to Manipur. Muivah has said this in several recent public statements as well. Other rivals also added to this, insulting the Kukis indiscriminately with adjectives like “refugees”, “foreigners”, etc., making this an open sore for the latter.
Kuki villages also have a tendency to proliferate because of a peculiar landholding tradition where village chiefs are sole owners of their villages, inducing capable villagers to leave and set up their own villages. This being so, even government initiatives such as the eviction of encroachers from reserved forests, the fight against Manipur’s new scourge of poppy plantations, or the push for citizenship registration, etc., came to be seen as targeting the Kukis.
On the other hand, the stated reason for the Meitei demand for ST status is so they are not alienated from their land. They also see injustice in the fact there is no creamy layer clause in the ST reservation system, thereby giving ST colleagues in similar or even higher income brackets a head start in matters of job pursuits and tax savings.
A skewed land revenue administration system inherited from colonial times—separating revenue flatlands from non-revenue hills—has also pushed the Meiteis against the wall. While everybody can settle in the Imphal Valley, traditionally the Meiteis’ home and which forms 10% of the state’s area, the Meiteis are prohibited from settling in the hills which constitute 90% of the area. As land scarcity is confronted by a burgeoning population, there is an increasing sense of siege amongst these communities. Though it is unlikely they would be eager to settle in the hills even if they were free to do so, the very knowledge that they are prohibited to do so has heightened their claustrophobia.
Three decades ago, of the 20 hill constituencies in Manipur’s 60-member Assembly, Nagas generally won 12 and Kukis 8. Today it is 10 each. Even a little influx of voters from outside can alter the balance further in these small constituencies. The examples of Kangpokpi, Chandel and Tengnoupal constituencies illustrate the potential for such a future conflict: Kangpokpi, once capable of having Naga, Kuki or even Nepali representatives, has today become a Kuki stronghold. Tengnoupal was once a Naga bastion, but today it has a Kuki representative. Chandel, once under a Naga grip, is now finely balanced between the Nagas and the Kukis.
Collective insecurities combined to make just the right mix for the storm on May 3. The question remains: what next? If the underlying causes of these troubles remain, there is no guarantee that more explosions like these will not happen in the future.
Pradip Phanjoubam
Editor of Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
