A Tribunal That Is Complete in Itself

Our public statutes contain only a few questions concerning the formation of tribunals that have been repeatedly reviewed. From the 1987 S.P. Sampat Kumar case to the November 2025 decision concerning the Madras Bar Association, courts have repealed laws, issued directions and then, on the same basis, found themselves reviewing new laws. The issue has gone through so many cycles that it itself shows how difficult the problem has been. The Tribunal Reform Bill, 2026 therefore draws attention because it appears to have finally identified the real problem and, it is hoped, also found a solution. The problem is not limited to India. Other countries have faced it and their diagnoses are worth noting. In Britain, when Sir Andrew Leggett reviewed the sector in 2001, he found that more than seventy tribunals were administered by the very departments whose decisions they were reviewing. He considered this the root defect. His remedy was not to change tenure or refine qualifications but to separate tribunals from their sponsoring departments and place their administration under a single service. This formed the basis of the 2007 Act. The reform was structural; it addressed the cause of dependence rather than its symptoms. India adopted the tribunal system early and, overall, it has been successful. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal established in 1941 remains one of the best examples of specialised adjudication. The model was expanded by Articles 323A and 323B and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and later extended to various regulatory areas at a level that higher courts could not reach. However our problem was different. As a 2020 court comment noted, independence can be ensured only when tribunals do not have to rely on the executive for their functioning. Numerous reforms have been attempted, each time with sincere intent, but most litigation thereafter focused on whether the tenure should be three, four or five years, whether a minimum age of fifty is acceptable, or whether a committee of one or two names should recommend appointments. None of these address the core issue. Independent tribunals do not depend on arithmetic. Tenure, age and number of names are diagnostic signs, not the disease itself. The core point is that a tribunal must be an independent and self‑sustaining institution with its own establishment, its own method of selecting members, its own mechanism for oversight and discipline, and its own facilities, staff and finances. Where all these exist, independence follows naturally. The new Bill answers all the points the courts have already raised, but it also seeks to create an institution that can implement those answers itself. The National Tribunal Commission will be created by law, its existence, formation and functions will be governed by the Act rather than an executive order, and it will be responsible for selection, monitoring, discipline and assessment of tribunal needs. A permanent professional secretariat will be set up around it. The Bill preserves judicial supremacy on each point where it matters. The Commission will be chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge or a chief judge of a high court, with a provision for a judicial majority. Committee chairs will be judicial, and decisive votes will rest with the judicial chair. Selection, monitoring, discipline and performance will all be led judicially. This aligns with the post‑R. Gandhi case stance that the executive, the biggest litigant, cannot play a major role in selecting those who decide its cases. Moreover, judicial supremacy does not mean control. Handing over the entire system to the judicial side is also seen as a challenge. Therefore the Bill places tribunals at an equal distance from the executive and judiciary on three levels. The central government sets broad principles through rules; the Commission creates regulations to implement those rules; the secretariat works within this framework, receiving guidance on procedures but not being directed at the operational level, and it derives its authority from the Act, not from any delegation. Consequently, a real balance of control arises from the combination of the National Tribunal Commission, the secretariat and the executive. The secretariat will verify eligibility and maintain records on which each decision will be based, bound by published regulations and keeping a record of its actions. The Bill maintains a delicate balance: no judicial interference in administration and no real dependence on the executive, while judicial supremacy remains in selection, monitoring, discipline and performance. Canada adopted a similar approach in 2014, keeping the independence of its federal tribunals while bringing their support services under one organization. Such a law should not be judged only by whether it survives judicial challenge, but by whether it eliminates the conditions that gave rise to those challenges. The Bill meets this test fully. If it works as intended, there is no doubt that tribunal administration will improve markedly, providing plaintiffs with a properly constituted, adequately organised forum where vacancies are filled promptly and performance is accountable. If this model succeeds, it will be useful for other types of selection in the future.